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In two experiments, we examined the recent claim (Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 2000) that verb-based implicit
causality information is used during sentence–final clausal integration only. We did so by looking for mid-sentence
reading delays caused by pronouns that are inconsistent with the bias of a preceding implicit causality verb (e.g., ‘‘David
praised Linda because he. . .’’). In a self-paced reading task, such pronouns immediately slowed down reading, at the two
words immediately following the pronoun. In eye tracking, bias-inconsistent pronouns also immediately perturbed the
reading process, as indexed by significant delays in various first pass measures at and shortly after the critical pronoun.
Hence, readers can recruit verb-based implicit causality information in the service of comprehension rapidly enough to
impact on the interpretation of a pronoun early in the subordinate clause. We take our results to suggest that implicit
causality is used proactively, allowing readers to focus on, and perhaps even predict, who or what will be talked about
next.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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If you praise somebody, you will typically do so
because of his or her behavior, not yours. If you apolo-
gize to somebody, however, the most likely relevant
cause is your behavior, not theirs. These simple probabi-
listic asymmetries express part of our knowledge about0749-596X/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserv
doi:10.1016/j.jml.2005.12.003
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Koornneef), berkum@psy.uva.nl (J.J.A. Van Berkum).when certain interpersonal transactions are appropriate,
and as such help us deal with—and make sense of—the
social world in which we live.
Perhaps not surprisingly, we also recruit this knowl-
edge when particular interpersonal transactions are
being described in language (Garvey & Caramazza,
1974). When asked to complete a sentence fragment
such as ‘‘David praised Linda because. . .’’, for example,
readers or listeners will be inclined to continue the
because-clause with something about Linda, as in exam-
ple (1) below.ed.
1 The terms ‘proactive’ and ‘retroactive’ are taken from
Garnham’s (2001) review of implicit causality research.
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Alternatively, after ‘‘David apologized to Linda
because. . .’’, people tend to continue with something
about David. In the above constructions, interpersonal
verbs like praise and apologize thus supply information
about whose behavior or state is the more likely imme-
diate cause of the event at hand. Because it is conveyed
implicitly as part of the meaning of the verb, this prob-
abilistic cue is usually referred to as implicit causality.
Early research on the comprehension of sentences
with implicit causality verbs (e.g., Au, 1986; Brown &
Fish, 1983; Caramazza, Grober, Garvey, & Yates,
1977; Garvey & Caramazza, 1974; Garvey, Caramazza,
& Yates, 1975) has shown that readers make use of this
cue to arrive at the correct sentence interpretation. One
consistent finding, for instance, is that if the causality
information explicitly provided in the remainder of the
sentence goes against the bias of the verb at hand, as
in example (2) below, people need more time to read
the entire sentence (Caramazza et al., 1977). Note that,
as illustrated in (2), the probabilistic bias of an implicit
causality verb can be negated without rendering the sen-
tence ungrammatical or incoherent. The fact that read-
ers slow down on a bias-inconsistent sentence is
therefore not the result of an overt anomaly. Instead,
it reflects something more subtle about the way we use
various sources of information in everyday language
comprehension.
(2) David praised Linda because he was very proud.
The early studies on implicit causality unequivocally
revealed that people are sensitive to the implicit causality
information associated with particular interpersonal
verbs. In the field of social cognition, these findings have
led to a closer examination of the semantic features by
means of which implicit causality verbs represent infor-
mation about interpersonal exchanges, and of how these
features might relate to models of social cognition (e.g.,
Brown & Fish, 1983; Semin & Marsman, 1994; see
Rudolph & Fo¨rsterling, 1997, for review). For psycho-
linguists, however, an important unresolved issue is
how and when verb-based implicit causality information
is brought to bear on the actual processing of an unfold-
ing sentence. Two contrasting accounts have been pro-
posed, which we will denote as clausal integration and
immediate focusing, respectively. According to the claus-
al integration account (e.g., Garnham, Traxler, Oakhill,
& Gernsbacher, 1996; Stewart et al., 2000), verb-based
implicit causality information is brought to bear on
comprehension relatively late in the unfolding sentence,
at or towards the end of the subordinate clause. More
specifically, implicit causality effects such as observed
by Caramazza et al. are believed to emerge when people
have read the main clause as well as the bulk of the sub-ordinate clause, and subsequently combine the causal
information provided by both clauses into a single rep-
resentation. Such ‘retroactive’ integration would be
more difficult if, as in (2), the causality information
made explicit in the subordinate clause is inconsistent
with the main verb’s implicit causality bias.
Proponents of the immediate focusing account
(e.g., Greene & McKoon, 1995; Long & De Ley,
2000; McKoon, Greene, & Ratcliff, 1993) have instead
suggested that implicit causality information can be
brought to bear on comprehension much more rapidly,
at the beginning of the subordinate because-clause, and
perhaps even already at the verb itself. In this account,
implicit causality is assumed to immediately bring one
of the persons referred to into focus, at the expense of
the other. Because readers and listeners prefer to relate
a personal pronoun to the most focused antecedent (see
Arnold, 1998, for review), such an immediate modula-
tion of focus would in turn affect the ease with which
a subsequent pronoun is processed. In this account,
the bias-inconsistent sentence (2) would take more time
to read because ‘‘David praised Linda because’’ immedi-
ately brings Linda into focus, thereby making it more
difficult to resolve the subsequent pronoun he in (2)
than the pronoun she in (1). Of course, this early con-
flict at the pronoun may have additional processing
consequences further downstream in the sentence. Thus,
the immediate focusing account is not incompatible
with an additional late processing delay at or towards
the end of the bias-inconsistent subordinate clause.
What distinguishes this account from the ‘retroactive’
clausal integration alternative is that only the former
allows for much earlier, ‘proactive’ effects of implicit
causality, right after the critical verb, its arguments,
and a connective like because.1
To keep track of the use of implicit causality infor-
mation, as a sentence is unfolding, recent studies have
exploited a so-called probe (or probe verification) task.
In this task, the participant is asked to decide as rapidly
as possible whether or not a particular probe word (e.g.,
‘‘Linda’’) has appeared in the sentence fragment present-
ed so far. By presenting the probe at various critical
positions within the unfolding sentence, this method
can be used to determine at what point(s) in the sentence
a particular discourse referent is in focus. Using this
probe task, Garnham et al. (1996) obtained support
for the clausal integration account: an effect of implicit
causality on late probes presented at the end of a sen-
tence, but no such effect on early probes presented right
after ‘‘because he.’’ However, the results of three other
studies with the probe task (Greene & McKoon, 1995;
Long & De Ley, 2000; McDonald & MacWhinney,
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with immediate focusing. Thus, findings obtained with
the probe task are mixed, with some support for either
account.
The advantage of a probe task is that it more or
less directly queries the accessibility of the pronoun’s
antecedents (e.g., Linda), and thus seems to provide a
straightforward measure of focus and any verb-based
modulations thereof. However, there is another side
to this coin, for such direct querying may also invite
readers to memorize the content words of a sentence
(see Gordon, Hendrick, & Foster, 2000, for evidence
that this can happen), and to invest an unrepresenta-
tive amount of attention in assigning antecedents
to pronouns. More generally, people do not verify
probes when they read or listen to linguistic input.
Although neither of these concerns necessarily invali-
dates the results obtained with a probe task, they do
point to the need for additional, less obtrusive
measures.
To avoid some of the potential problems associated
with the probe task, Stewart et al. (2000) tracked the
use of implicit causality information during sentence
comprehension by means of a self-paced reading task.
In the most relevant experiment (Experiment 4), people
read sentences much like our examples (1) and (2) in
two large fragments, one up to and including the crit-
ical pronoun and the other fragment containing the
remainder of the sentence. Although the average read-
ing times on bias-inconsistent first fragments like
‘‘David praised Linda because he’’ were 50 ms larger
than reading times on bias-consistent fragments like
‘‘David praised Linda because she’’, this early difference
was not significant. However, inconsistency with verb
bias did significantly delay reading of the subsequent
second fragments, by some 206 ms. These and related
reading time findings have led Stewart et al. to strongly
embrace the clausal integration account, in which
implicit causality only becomes relevant ‘‘at the point
where the interpretation of the two clauses are integrat-
ed into a single representation for the sentence as a
whole’’ (p. 424). In a recent and thorough review of
implicit causality research, Garnham (2001) also arrives
at the conclusion that verb-based implicit causality
information is used towards the end of the sentence,
during the ‘retroactive’ integration of main and subor-
dinate clause.
If this conclusion is correct, however, it would set the
influence of implicit causality information on sentence
comprehension apart from that of a wide range of other
sources of information that have been shown to affect
the comprehension process very rapidly. For example,
we know from ERP research (see Kutas & Van Petten,
1994, for review) that sentences such as ‘‘He buttered
the memo before he took a bite’’ elicit an N400 effect
right at the anomalous noun, which betrays the immedi-ate use of verb-based semantics. Verb-specific lexical
information is also rapidly accessed and used in sen-
tence-medial syntactic ambiguity resolution (Osterhout
& Holcomb, 1992; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Kello,
1993). Furthermore, and particularly relevant to our
present concerns, the semantics of a verb can immediate-
ly restrict the domain of reference within a particular
context (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Kamide, Altmann,
& Haywood, 2003; Nieuwland & Van Berkum, in press).
To the extent that it provides relevant and sufficiently
strong (i.e., biasing) information, why would the partic-
ular semantic features of a verb that express implicit
causality be an exception to the rule? Note that ERP
studies on story comprehension suggest that even wider
discourse is immediately and incrementally brought to
bear on the syntactic, semantic, and referential analysis
of an unfolding sentence (e.g., St. George, Mannes, &
Hoffman, 1994; Van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort,
1999a; Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Brown, & Hagoort,
2003; see Van Berkum, 2004; Van Berkum, in prepara-
tion, for review). If probabilistic global discourse-level
information can affect the analysis of an unfolding sen-
tence at every relevant word coming in, within only a
few hundred milliseconds from word onset, why would
the impact of a relevant local causality cue need to wait
for the sentence to terminate?
A principled delay in the use of implicit causality
might make sense in the context of models that (possi-
bly inspired by the thorough feature-space analyses of
social psychologists; e.g., Rudolph & Fo¨rsterling,
1997) grant a special status to the causality-related
semantic features of verbs like praise and disappoint.
It can also make sense if one assumes that the process-
ing of subordinate clauses is only locally incremental,
and that such clauses are related to their main clause
context only when fully processed (see Millis & Just,
1994, for exactly this claim). However, if, as we were
inclined to believe, implicit causality is ‘just another
bit of verb meaning’ (and subordinate clauses are not
initially processed in a semantic vacuum), a principled
substantial delay in using this information would be
very hard to understand. In the two studies reported
below, we therefore set out to test the hypothesis that
implicit causality information is only used during sen-
tence–final clausal integration. We did so by looking
for mid-sentence reading delays caused by pronouns
that are inconsistent with the bias of a preceding
implicit causality verb (cf. example 2). In Experiment
1, we kept track of the impact of implicit causality
by means of word-by-word self-paced reading. In
Experiment 2, we used eye tracking, as participants
freely read through the same materials. We predicted
that verb-based implicit causality information would
become available rapidly enough to bear on the inter-
pretation of a pronoun encountered very early in the
sentence.
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As discussed before, the self-paced reading findings of
Stewart et al. (2000) were taken to support the clausal
integration account. However, in the Stewart et al. exper-
iments the critical sentences were presented in two rela-
tively large fragments, with the first part consisting of
the main clause plus the connective and the anaphor
(either a pronoun or proper name), and with the second
part consisting of the remainder of the subordinate
clause. Thus, a sentence like ‘‘David praised Linda
because he was very happy with the results’’ would be pre-
sented as [David praised Linda because he] [was very hap-
py with the results]. With only two such ‘sample points’
per sentence, the temporal resolution of the Stewart
et al. design is rather low. An important consequence is
that the observed average reading times are very large,
making it difficult to pick up on small reading time
effects. Note that in the most relevant experiment (Exper-
iment 4), fragments containing bias-inconsistent pro-
nouns did delay reading by 50 ms. However, the
average total reading time on those first fragments
exceeded 2000 ms. The variance associated with such
large reading times may well have swamped a small pro-
noun effect.
Furthermore, because of the specific sentence parti-
tioning used by Stewart et al., some of the early process-
ing consequences elicited by an inconsistent pronoun
may actually have ended up in reading times at the first
few words in the second fragment, and as such errone-
ously have been taken as evidence for the clausal inte-
gration account. With only three button presses per
trial, the participants in the Stewart et al. self-paced
reading experiments will probably have suffered some-
what less from the spill-over of effects caused by a
task-induced ‘button-press rhythm.’ However, spill-over
may also have a much deeper cause. For instance, ERP
research in which a singular gender-marked pronoun he
had two equally salient male antecedents, or only female
antecedents, has revealed that the processing conse-
quences of such referential problems can last until
over a second after pronoun onset, i.e., well beyond
the average time that people look at such words (Van
Berkum, Zwitserlood, Bastiaansen, Brown, & Hagoort,
2004). The implication is that the processing conse-
quences of a bias-inconsistent pronoun in the Stewart
et al. experiment may well have delayed reading of the
first few words in the second fragment. In all, there is
reason to believe that the large fragments used in the
Stewart et al. self-paced reading experiments may have
caused them to miss small effects on the pronoun itself,
and confound true sentence-final clausal integration
effects with earlier effects spilled over from the pronoun,
making it impossible to determine whether implicit
causality information enters the comprehension process
early or late.To solve the above problems and obtain the temporal
resolution needed to detect potentially small sentence-
medial effects, we used word-by-word self-paced reading
in our experiment. As illustrated by the critical sentences
(3a) and (3b) below, the pronoun was held constant
across condition. Instead of contrasting the Dutch equiv-
alents of he and she (as in examples 1 and 2), we manip-
ulated whether or not the fixed pronoun he was
consistent with the verb’s bias by swapping the argument
position of the man and the woman involved. We avoid-
ed the Dutch equivalent of she because it is ambiguous
between a singular and a plural third-person pronoun.
Furthermore, using the same pronoun across conditions
allowed us to examine the claim (Garnham, 2001; Oak-
hill, Garnham, Reynolds, & Wilshire, 1998) that implicit
causality effects observed in language comprehension
would be artifacts of ‘low-level’ (e.g., word frequency)
differences between the respective critical fragments used
in bias-consistent and -inconsistent items.
(3a) verb bias towards the 2nd NP, bias-consistent pro-
noun
Linda praised David because he had been able
to complete the difficult assignment with very little
help.
(3b) verb bias towards the 2nd NP, bias-inconsistent
pronoun
David praised Linda because he had been able
to complete the difficult assignment with her help
only.
As can be seen in examples (3a) and (3b), the end of the
sentence was always consistent with the interpretation
enforced by the pronoun, and a coherent interpretation
was therefore always available. However, to ensure that
any effects spilling over from a bias-inconsistent pro-
noun into the reading times of the immediately subse-
quent words would also not be confounded with the
effects of the different sentence continuations that were
required to achieve overall coherence, at least five words
after the pronoun were held constant across conditions.
The critical issue is whether, relative to a consistent
pronoun in sentences like (3a), a bias-inconsistent pro-
noun in sentences like (3b) causes a delay in self-paced
reading at or shortly after the offending pronoun.
Because the clausal integration account restricts the
use of implicit causality information to clause-integra-
tion processes occurring at the end of the subordinate
clause, this account does not predict an inconsistency
effect at or shortly after the pronoun. According to
immediate focusing account, however, fragments like
‘‘X praised Y because’’ immediately bring Y into focus,
which should make it more difficult to resolve the subse-
quent pronoun he in (3b) than in (3a). We know from
other research with on-line tasks (e.g., Boland et al.,
1998; Arnold, Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell,
Table 1





excuses aanbieden (apologize) 1.00
bekennen aan (confess) 1.04
teleurstellen (disappoint) 1.04
vervelen (bore) 1.05









winnen van (win) 1.18
misleiden (mislead) 1.22
irriteren (irritate) 1.22

















verantwoordelijk stellen (hold responsible) 1.91




houden van (love) 1.86
bedanken (thank) 1.82
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problems with pronoun resolution begin to emerge with-
in only a few hundred milliseconds after pronoun onset.
The immediate focus account therefore predicts that an
inconsistency effect should appear at the pronoun, or,
due to spill-over, rapidly thereafter.
Method
Participants
Participants were 24 undergraduate psychology stu-
dents (21 female, mean age 21, range 18–33 years) who
received course credit or money for their participation.
In this and the following experiment, participants were
native speakers of Dutch, without a diagnosed reading
or learning disability.
Materials
Based on translations of English verbs used in previ-
ous research, 116 Dutch verbs were selected, of which 57
were expected to have a strong implicit causality bias
towards the second noun phrase (henceforth NP2, e.g.,
the verb prijzen, to praise) and 59 a strong bias towards
the first noun phrase (NP1, e.g., the verb teleurstellen, to
disappoint). In a written sentence completion pretest, 45
native speakers of Dutch (23 female, mean age 22, range
18–61 years) were asked to complete the Dutch equiva-
lent of fragments like ‘‘John disappointed Paul because
he___’’, and to subsequently denote the intended male
antecedent of the pronoun he by encircling the name.
If the participant marked NP1 the trial was scored as
1, and if he or she marked NP2 the trial was scored as
2. Calculating the mean score for every verb provides
information about the direction of the verb’s bias as well
as its strength (indexed via the consistency of the bias
across participants), with a strong NP1-bias giving a
score close to 1, a strong NP2-bias giving a score close
to 2, and the absence of a bias giving a score around
1.5. Twenty verbs with a strong NP1-bias and 20 verbs
with a strong NP2-bias were selected for Experiment 1
(mean bias NP1-verbs: 1.14, NP2: 1.94; Table 1 contains
the relevant verbs and their approximate English
translation).
Following McKoon et al. (1993), we constructed two
different three-sentence stories for every verb for the
main experiment, using scenarios that were expected to
be of interest to the average participant. An example
that involves an NP1 verb is given in (4), together with
an approximate translation. In the first sentence a situa-
tion was sketched in which a man and a woman were
introduced by name. For half of the texts, the first-men-
tioned character was the man, and for the other half, the
woman (balanced across the NP1 and NP2 stories). In
the second sentence a pronominal (usually they) was
used to keep both characters in focus to an equal extent.
The main clause of the third sentence contained the crit-ical verb and felicitously repeated the names of the two
characters. The subordinate clause contained the critical
pronoun he and was always adjoined to the main clause
by the connective because.
(4a) NP1-biased verb, bias-consistent pronoun
David en Linda reden allebei behoorlijk hard.
Bij een druk kruispunt botsten zij met hun auto’s
stevig op elkaar. David bood zijn excuses aan Lin-
da aan omdat hij volgens de getuigen van het ong-
eluk alle schuld had.
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a busy intersection they crashed hard into each
other. David apologized to Linda because he
according to the witnesses was the one to blame.)
(4b) NP1-biased verb, bias-inconsistent pronoun
David en Linda reden allebei behoorlijk hard.
Bij een druk kruispunt botsten zij met hun auto’s
stevig op elkaar. Linda bood haar excuses aan
David aan omdat hij volgens de getuigen van
het ongeluk geen schuld had.
(David and Linda were both driving pretty fast. At
a busy intersection they crashed hard into each
other. Linda apologized to David because he
according to the witnesses was not the one to
blame.)
The critical manipulation was whether or not the
pronoun he was consistent with the verb’s implicit cau-
sality bias. For NP1-biased verbs, he is consistent if
the male character occupies the NP1-position of the
main clause, as in (4a), but inconsistent if the female
character occupies that position, as in (4b). For NP2-bi-
ased verbs, the mapping is reversed, as in example (3)
given before. To accommodate for spill-over, at least
five words after he were held constant across conditions.
After these five words the consistent and inconsistent
versions diverged, and ended with explicit causal infor-
mation that made the story coherent as a whole (see
Appendix A for all Dutch originals).
To rule out any accidental biases in the constructed
materials, incomplete versions of our stories were present-
ed to 20 native speakers ofDutch (18 female,mean age 24,
range 19–41 years) in a second paper-and-pencil comple-
tion test. Theparticipants (noneofwhich hadparticipated
in the sentence pretest) read our stories in the form illus-
trated by ‘‘David and Linda were both driving pretty fast.
At a busy intersection they crashed hard into each other.
___ apologized to ___ because ___’’, and they were asked
touse the names in the story tofill in the blanks of themain
clause, and to subsequently finish the story as they liked.
There was no preference for a particular order of mention
of the male or female character in the main clause of the
critical sentence. In stories with an NP1-biased verb, par-
ticipants used the man-verb-woman order—the order
used in the bias-consistent version of these stories in the
main experiments—about half of the time (53%). Similar-
ly, in stories with an NP2-biased verb, participants used
the woman-verb-man order—the order used in the bias-
consistent version of these stories in the main experi-
ments—also about half of the time (51%). This suggests
that the specific way in which the two genders had been
paired to the two verb arguments in our stories was
deemed equally plausible for the consistent and inconsis-
tent versions. In addition, the subsequent completion of
subordinate clauses revealed that the wider story context
had essentially not changed the bias of our verbs. Acrossthe completions in which participants had used either he
or she immediately after the connective because (95% of
all completions), the NP1-verb stories showed a strong
bias towards the subject of the main clause (mean bias
1.10) and the NP2-verb stories a strong bias towards the
object (mean bias 1.90).
The stimuli were divided into two lists, with each list
containing 20 bias-consistent and 20 bias-inconsistent
stories, and with only one version of each story in a par-
ticular list. To avoid strategic processing, we used as
many NP1-verbs as NP2-verbs (10 each) within each
condition in each list. Forty stories of an unrelated
experiment were included as fillers (see Van Berkum
et al., 2005b, Experiment 3). One pseudo-randomization
was used for both lists. The original randomization
order was used for one half of the participants, the
reversed order for the other half. A set of 40 2-choice
questions was included to encourage discourse compre-
hension. Half of the questions followed the experimental
items and half followed the filler items. Furthermore,
half of the correct answers appeared on the left of the
screen and half on the right. The questions never direct-
ly probed the referent of the pronoun.
Procedure
The stories were presented on a fast LCD screen (Iiy-
ama TXA 3834 MT) and responses were collected with
response boxes integrated in the armrests of the chair.
The stories were presented in a standard non-cumulative
moving-window self-paced reading paradigm, using a
non-proportional Courier 14p font. Subjects read
through each story word by word, with each button
press disclosing the next word while replacing all other
letters in the story by hyphens. As they pressed their
way through a story, subjects could see its overall sen-
tential and formatting layout (including punctuation),
as well as the position of the currently visible word
therein. To prevent ‘edge effects’ in reading times, the
critical region, which included the pronoun and five sub-
sequent words, was always separated from the left and
right paragraph edges by at least one word. Subjects
were asked to process each story for comprehension,
and to adapt their speed to this. Participants progressed
through a text by pressing a button with the index finger
of their dominant hand.
Each session started with a written instruction. The
actual self-paced reading experiment consisted of four
blocks. Block one was a practice block in which 10 sto-
ries were presented, five followed by a question. This
familiarized the participant with the procedure and in
addition gave the experimenter the opportunity to mon-
itor the reading speed of the participants. Participants
who read extremely slowly were encouraged to speed
up. The participant had an obligatory one-minute break
between the different experimental blocks. Each experi-
mental block started with two practice stories. After
Fig. 1. Mean reading times (in ms) for the consistent and
inconsistent condition in Experiment 1 (error bars indicate one
side of a 95% confidence interval based on the MSE-value; see
Masson and Loftus, 2003).
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ipants were administered a Dutch version of the reading
span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). A full session
was completed within 60 min, with an average time-on-
task of 40 min.
Analysis
Prior to all analyses, we evaluated the comprehension
question performance of our participants. All partici-
pants scored above 75% correct (mean score 94%).
Reading times more than 2 standard deviations from
both the participant’s mean and the item’s mean in a
particular condition were treated as missing data
(2.1%). We report means and statistical analyses for
the factor Consistency for the critical pronoun, each of
the five words following the pronoun (spill-over region),
and each of the four words preceding it (pre-critical
region). We only discuss effects that are significant by
subjects (F1) and by items (F2), and we report the asso-
ciated minF 0 values in tables (Clark, 1973; Raaijmakers,
Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999).
Because implicit causality results are customarily
reported for NP1- and NP2-verbs separately, our analy-
ses of variance will also take direction of the bias into
account (Verb Bias). However, note that the comparison
of inconsistency effects elicited by NP1 verbs and NP2
verbs is confounded with the effects of distance between
anaphor and antecedent, of first mention, and of the
antecedent’s structural position (see Garnham, 2001,
for an overview of the relevance of these factors). For
this reason, we focus our discussion and figures on the
main effects of Consistency.
Results and discussion
As can be seen from the mean reading times (col-
lapsed over Verb Bias) in Fig. 1 and the associated F tests
displayed in Table 2, words in the pre-critical region were
read equally fast across Consistency condition. However,
readers began to slow down right at the bias-inconsistent
pronoun, with a significant main effect of Consistency
emerging at the first two words after this pronoun. This
effect was not significantly modulated by whether the
verb was biased towards NP1 or NP2.22 We also did not find any significant modulations of the
inconsistency effect as a function of whether the participant’s
reading span was above or below the median score for this
sample (span = 5.08 vs. 2.67 respectively, SD = 1.00 vs .44). We
note that, because our undergraduate participants were all
relatively highly skilled readers, the absence of significant
reading span effects in our study is not necessarily incompatible
with the skill-dependent inconsistency effects reported by Long
and De Ley (2000), and otherwise refrain from further
discussion.This pattern of results suggests that implicit causality
information becomes available rapidly enough to have
an impact on the interpretation of a pronoun occurring
in mid-sentence. The immediate focusing account, where
implicit causality information immediately makes the
bias-consistent referent more accessible than the bias-in-
consistent referent, just before the referring pronoun
comes along, explicitly predicted such results. The claus-
al integration account, however, assumes that implicit
causality is used only after the bulk of the subordinate
clause has been read and the interpretations of the two
clauses are integrated into a single interpretation for
the sentence as a whole, an assumption that is difficult
to reconcile with our findings.
Because the inconsistency effect in our experiment did
not reach significance on the critical pronoun itself, and,
presumably due to spill-over, emerged as a reliable effect
on the two subsequent words only, our findings in fact
provide a straightforward explanation for why Stewart
et al. (2000) did not find any evidence for an early effect
of implicit causality. Recall that Stewart et al. presented
the sentences in two large fragments, with the split right
after the critical pronoun. If, like the readers in our
study, the readers in the Stewart et al. experiments only
really slowed down right after the bias-inconsistent pro-
noun, this early effect would be visible in reading times
to the second fragment only, and would as such mistak-
enly be taken as support for late clausal integration.
Thus, the present word-by-word reading time results
confirm our earlier hypothesis about Stewart et al.’s ear-
ly null result. More generally, our results testify to the
importance of tracking the use of a potentially relevant
cue to sentence comprehension with sufficient temporal
resolution.
Although our findings are in line with the immediate
focusing account, we need to address two possible con-
cerns over the non-cumulative word-by-word self-paced
Table 2
Mean reading times and analysis of variance results for Experiment 1
Wordposition
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
e.g.:
Consistent: Linda praised David because he had been able to complete
Inconsistent: David praised Linda because he had been able to complete
Reading time (in ms)
Total
Consistent 422 410 408 401 338 341 351 376 367 368
Inconsistent 418 404 417 404 349 363 375 391 376 382
NP1-bias
Consistent 420 403 409 403 347 350 340 388 373 371
Inconsistent 411 409 425 424 357 382 371 401 387 378
NP2-bias
Consistent 425 417 408 400 329 333 362 364 361 365
Inconsistent 424 399 410 384 340 343 379 380 364 386
F1 (Consistency, df = 1, 23)
F <1 <1 1.065 <1 1.452 9.107 7.477 1.993 1.015 3.187
MSE 1127 2992 1755 1290 1772 1241 1815 2561 1774 1540
p .526 .623 .313 .720 .245 .006* .012* .171 .324 .087
F2 (Consistency, df = 1, 38)
F <1 <1 1.362 <1 1.733 9.379 9.643 1.966 1.386 3.423
MSE 1944 1099 1137 2269 1096 955 1239 2625 894 1257
p .685 .519 .250 .848 .196 .004* .004* .169 .246 .072
minF 0 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 4.620 4.211 <1 <1 1.650
df 1, 59 1, 48 1, 53 1, 55 1, 55 1, 57 1, 53 1, 58 1, 52 1, 56
p .731 .694 .443 .866 .378 .036* .045* .324 .478 .204
F1 (Consistency · Verb Bias, df = 1, 23)
F <1 1.235 <1 6.161 <1 2.181 1.326 <1 <1 1.244
MSE 2025 2854 1208 1278 858 1289 985 2850 1151 1104
p .668 .278 .378 .021* .973 .153 .261 .941 .425 .276
F2 (Consistency · Verb Bias, df = 1, 38)
F <1 3.096 <1 3.086 <1 2.789 1.026 <1 <1 <1
MSE 1944 1099 1137 2269 1096 955 1239 2625 894 1257
p .701 .087 .477 .087 .982 .103 .317 .989 .382 .352
minF 0 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 <1 <1 2.056 <1 1.223 <1 <1 <1 <1
df 1, 60 1, 41 1, 61 1, 61 1, 57 1, 53 1, 60 1, 39 1, 55 1, 61
p .773 .353 .577 .157 .982 .274 .450 .992 .552 .474
* p < .05.
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word reading paradigm has a higher temporal resolution
than the clause-by-clause paradigm of Stewart et al., the
task is of course somewhat unnatural, as people normal-
ly do not press a button after reading each individual
word (but see Mitchell, 2004, for an eloquent defense
of the self-paced reading task). Furthermore, and per-
haps more important in the context at hand, our use
of a non-cumulative moving-window paradigm made itimpossible for participants to regress to earlier parts of
the sentence. It could be argued that readers will adapt
to this situation by resorting to a more incremental pro-
cessing strategy, in which they more immediately use the
information afforded by each word—such as implicit
causality—than they would do in unconstrained read-
ing. To address these two potential concerns over our
self-paced reading study, we repeated the experiment
with the eye tracking methodology.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 24 members from the Utrecht Uni-
versity community (23 female, mean age 21, range 18–34
years) who received money for their participation.
Materials
The materials were the same as in Experiment 1,
with two small exceptions. One is that in order to raise
fixation probability, the two words following the criti-
cal pronoun he were changed, if necessary, such that
they had a minimal length of five characters. Further-
more, because of demands associated with the eye
tracker and the variable length of words within the
five-word spill-over region, the one or two last words
of this region (i.e., words 9 and 10 in the results table)
were sometimes displayed on the next line. The same
fillers, randomizations, and comprehension questions
were used.
Procedure
A head-mounted SMI eye tracker was used to mon-
itor eye movements. The tracker had an angular resolu-
tion of 20 s of arc, and monitored both eye’s gaze
locations every 4 ms. The stories were presented as a
whole on a CRT (Nokia Multigraph 446xpro) screen.
Before presentation, a fixation mark appeared on screen
at the position of the first word of the first sentence. Par-
ticipants were instructed to fixate this mark before they
made a story visible by pressing a button. After reading
a story the participants again pressed this button to pro-
gress. The comprehension questions that followed 40
pseudo-randomly determined trials were answered using
two buttons on the same response box. Each session
started with a written instruction, after which we mount-
ed and calibrated the eye tracker. During the calibration
procedure the participants had to fixate a random
sequence of dots at various locations on screen. Upon
successful calibration the experiment started with five
practice trials, two followed by a question. Before the
experimental trials were presented the eye tracker was
recalibrated. This procedure was repeated three times
throughout the experiment. Each session ended with
the administration of a Dutch reading span task, and
was completed within 50 min.33 Due to very low variability, the results of the reading span
task did not allow for a sensible median split, and we therefore
refrained from analyzing the results of Experiment 2 as a
function of reading span group.Analysis
All participants scored above 85% correct (mean
score 94%) on the comprehension questions. Prior to
all analyses, we removed 5.6% of the trials because
major tracker losses and eye blinks made it impossible
to determine the course of fixations at or directly around
the critical pronoun. Furthermore, if a fixation was
shorter than 80 ms and within one character space of
the previous or next fixation, it was assimilated to this
fixation. All remaining fixations shorter than 80 ms, as
well as fixations longer than 1200 ms or containing
blinks, were excluded (8.4%). Because short words like
pronouns receive very few fixations, we extended the
region for the pronoun by six characters to the left, if
the pronoun was skipped during first pass reading. This
leftward-shifting procedure is based on evidence that
readers are able to obtain lexical information from
words beginning six characters from a particular fixa-
tion, and on evidence that the perceptual span is asym-
metric to the right of a fixation (see Rayner & Sereno
(1994) for more discussion). In the current experiment,
the procedure increased the probability for fixating the
critical pronoun from 42 to 86%. If after this procedure,
the pronoun was still not fixated, the data point for the
trial was treated as missing data (as was done for any
other word that was not fixated during first pass
reading).
As in Experiment 1, we will report mean reading
times and statistical analysis for the factor Consistency
(and its interaction with Verb Bias) for four words in
the pre-critical region, the critical pronoun, and five
words in the spill-over region. We will discuss three dif-
ferent first-pass eye movement measures. First-Fixation
Duration reflects the duration of the very first fixation
on a word. First-Gaze Duration is the total reading time
of a word before the reader either moves on, or looks
back in the text. Finally, Regression Path Durations
are the sum of fixation and saccade durations from the
time when the reader encounters a word, to the time
when the reader enters the region after this word. This
means that if the reader looks back after reading a word
(a regression), the regression path time includes all fixa-
tion and saccade durations of this regression. All mea-
sures are presumed to be sensitive for processes that
occur relatively early during comprehension.44 First-gaze durations consist of first fixation durations plus
any additional fixations on the word that directly follow the
first fixation. Similarly, the regression path duration incorpo-
rates the first gaze duration, as well as the duration of the
regression (if present) that directly follows after fixating a
particular word. As a result, the different measures incremen-
tally allow processes that occur somewhat later to enter the
measure.
Fig. 4. Mean regression path durations (in ms) for the
consistent and inconsistent condition in Experiment 2.
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Figs. 2–4 display the mean first fixation duration,
first-gaze reading time, and regression path time as a
function of Consistency and word position, collapsed
across Verb Bias. Tables 3–5 report the associated statis-
tics, as well as additional data for the Consistency by
Verb Bias interaction. In the pre-critical region, none
of the three measures revealed a significant main effect
of Consistency. However, relative to their bias-consis-
tent counterparts, pronouns that were inconsistent with
the implicit causality bias of the preceding verb reliably
perturbed the reading process at or shortly after the pro-
noun. At the pronoun itself, the inconsistency effect
emerged most clearly in the regression path duration.
Furthermore, three words after the critical pronoun, sig-
nificant inconsistency effects emerged both in first fixa-
tion and first gaze duration.
As in Experiment 1, there were no reliable interac-
tions between Consistency and Verb Bias at or directly
following the critical pronoun. At the second word inFig. 2. Mean first fixation durations (in ms) for the consistent
and inconsistent condition in Experiment 2.
Fig. 3. Mean first-gaze durations (in ms) for the consistent and
inconsistent condition in Experiment 2.the pre-critical region, we did however obtain a signifi-
cant Consistency by Verb Bias interaction, in first-gaze
and regression path durations. In both measures the
reading times on this word in NP1 stories were longer
in the consistent versions than in the inconsistent ones,
whereas the opposite was observed for NP2 stories.
We are inclined to interpret this as a chance effect, pos-
sibly related to the fact that, in contrast to the critical
region, different words are involved across conditions.
As in Experiment 1, we obtained effects of implicit
causality right after—and in this case even at—the crit-
ical pronoun, only two words into the subordinate
clause. This shows that the early effects of implicit cau-
sality on sentence processing obtained in Experiment 1
cannot be attributed to particular strategies adopted in
the self-paced reading task. Moreover, these eye tracking
findings again show that implicit causality becomes
available very early in the comprehension process, as
predicted by the immediate focusing account. Regard-
less of whether readers make their way through a story
in self-paced or unconstrained reading, the implicit cau-
sality information afforded by biased interpersonal verbs
like praise or disappoint is brought to bear on sentence
comprehension rapidly enough to have an impact on
the interpretation of a referring pronoun occurring in
mid-sentence, only two words into the subordinate
clause.General discussion
In two comprehension experiments, we examined the
recent claim (e.g., Garnham, 2001; Stewart et al., 2000)
that verb-based implicit causality information is only
used during sentence-final clausal integration. We did
so by looking for mid-sentence reading delays caused by
pronouns that are inconsistent with the bias of a preced-
ing implicit causality verb (e.g., ‘‘David praised Linda
because he. . .’’). In Experiment 1, we kept track of the
Table 3
Mean first fixation durations and analysis of variance results for Experiment 2
Wordposition
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
e.g.:
Consistent: Linda praised David because he had been able to complete
Inconsistent: David praised Linda because he had been able to complete
First fixation duration (in ms)
Total
Consistent 206 203 194 177 187 189 199 184 188 198
Inconsistent 209 200 204 171 191 193 200 205 187 195
NP1-bias
Consistent 203 201 187 178 193 189 203 174 188 191
Inconsistent 199 192 206 166 191 194 199 205 185 190
NP2-bias
Consistent 209 204 200 175 180 189 194 194 188 204
Inconsistent 219 208 202 176 191 191 200 204 188 200
F1 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 1.931 <1 1.754 <1 <1 14.268 <1 <1
df 1, 23 1, 23 1, 21 1, 20 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23
MSE 937 961 1291 1281 222 299 357 684 480 828
p .633 .730 .179 .506 .198 .329 .761 .001* .762 .662
F2 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 <1 1.033 <1 <1 <1 4.913 <1 <1
df 1, 38 1, 38 1, 36 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 37 1, 37 1, 36
MSE 952 1755 843 834 573 344 484 1909 1408 927
p .791 .568 .487 .316 .334 .515 .780 .033* .880 .325
minF 0 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 3.654 <1 <1
df 1, 56 1, 40 1, 51 1, 38 1, 61 1, 60 1, 59 1, 56 1, 52 1, 32
p .816 .767 .533 .576 .434 .585 .836 .061 .892 .688
F1 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F 1.411 <1 <1 1.207 3.651 <1 1.098 2.663 <1 <1
df 1, 23 1, 23 1, 21 1, 20 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23
MSE 918 1331 1870 695 275 345 497 929 883 765
p .247 .415 .401 .285 .069 .661 .306 .116 .726 .790
F2 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 <1 <1 2.895 1.527 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
df 1, 38 1, 38 1, 36 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 37 1, 37 1, 36
MSE 952 1755 843 834 573 344 484 1909 1408 927
p .471 .601 .370 .097 .224 .676 .562 .357 .570 .363
minF 0 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 <1 <1 <1 1.076 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
df 1, 58 1, 59 1, 51 1, 37 1, 59 1, 59 1, 56 1, 56 1, 40 1, 27
p .538 .657 .536 .362 .304 .761 .612 .421 .764 .797
* p < .05.
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self-paced reading. InExperiment 2, we used eye tracking,
as participants freely read through the same materials.
In both experiments, we obtained evidence for such
pronoun-induced delays. In self-paced reading (Experi-
ment 1), pronouns that were inconsistent with theimplicit causality bias of the verb reliably slowed down
reading right after the pronoun. In unconstrained read-
ing (Experiment 2) such pronouns also immediately per-
turbed the reading process, as indexed by significant
delays, in various first pass measures, at and shortly
after the critical pronoun. The eye tracking results con-
Table 4
Mean first-gaze durations and analysis of variance results for Experiment 2
Wordposition
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
e.g.:
Consistent: Linda praised David because he had been able to complete
Inconsistent: David praised Linda because he had been able to complete
First-gaze duration (in ms)
Total
Consistent 227 245 244 199 190 210 220 205 209 243
Inconsistent 233 253 251 186 200 214 222 230 210 237
NP1-bias
Consistent 227 252 229 206 195 211 225 194 208 250
Inconsistent 224 230 232 187 202 209 225 224 201 239
NP2-bias
Consistent 227 237 259 192 185 208 215 216 209 236
Inconsistent 241 275 269 184 197 218 219 236 219 234
F1 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 <1 1.968 5.705 <1 <1 12.814 <1 <1
df 1, 23 1, 23 1, 21 1, 20 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23
MSE 1835 3890 4306 1924 351 747 691 1136 2103 1147
p .520 .524 .678 .176 .026* .468 .696 .002* .861 .344
F2 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 <1 1.387 2.096 <1 <1 6.054 1.170 3.094
df 1, 38 1, 38 1, 36 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 37 1, 37 1, 36
MSE 2636 3663 1134 1455 1221 1014 1558 2601 2228 1285
p .590 .807 .987 .246 .156 .494 .821 .019* .286 .087
minF 0 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 <1 <1 1.532 <1 <1 4.111 <1 <1
df 1, 61 1, 48 1, 36 1, 57 1, 58 1, 59 1, 57 1, 59 1, 24 1, 37
p .678 .820 .992 .371 .221 .616 .844 .047* .863 .402
F1 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F 2.074 7.244 <1 <1 <1 1.122 <1 <1 <1 <1
df 1, 23 1, 23 1, 21 1, 20 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23
MSE 842 3000 401 1091 491 730 809 1904 2014 1036
p .163 .013* .405 .472 .540 .300 .713 .596 .344 .477
F2 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 4.064 2.261 <1 <1 1.007 <1 <1 <1 <1
df 1, 38 1, 38 1, 36 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 37 1, 37 1, 36
MSE 2636 3663 1134 1455 1221 1014 1558 2601 2228 1285
p .372 .051 .141 .472 .665 .322 .976 .858 .866 .839
minF 0 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 2.603 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
df 1, 59 1, 61 1, 35 1, 53 1, 60 1, 59 1, 39 1, 45 1, 39 1, 39
p .447 .112 .464 .608 .722 .469 .974 .866 .868 .893
* p < .05.
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in Experiment 1 is not a consequence of unnatural com-
prehension strategies induced by the word-by-word
self-paced reading task. Furthermore, because we used
identical critical words across bias-consistent and -in-
consistent conditions, our results also unequivocally ruleout the possibility [suggested by Oakhill et al. (1998) and
Garnham (2001)] that the implicit causality effects
observed in language comprehension are artifacts of
‘low-level’ differences between bias-consistent and -in-
consistent critical fragments. Hence, across experiments
and methodologies, we have evidence that readers can
Table 5
Mean regression path durations and analysis of variance results for Experiment 2
Wordposition
4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
e.g.:
Consistent: Linda praised David because he had been able to complete
Inconsistent: David praised Linda because he had been able to complete
Regression path duration (in ms)
Total
Consistent 253 301 305 333 209 248 271 281 314 395
Inconsistent 249 311 267 354 255 279 314 354 280 318
NP1-bias
Consistent 249 317 299 357 212 250 276 264 313 466
Inconsistent 240 266 248 329 282 289 311 290 275 306
NP2-bias
Consistent 256 284 310 308 205 245 265 297 314 323
Inconsistent 258 355 276 378 227 269 316 417 284 330
F1 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 8.438 <1 6.144 3.604 3.531 2.858 2.375 3.473
df 1, 23 1, 23 1, 21 1, 20 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23
MSE 3967 9864 4765 18503 8215 6577 12735 44429 11820 40105
p .809 .644 .008* .485 .021* .070 .073 .104 .137 .075
F2 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 3.946 <1 4.772 4.609 3.229 1.946 <1 1.920
df 1, 38 1, 38 1, 36 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 37 1, 37 1, 36
MSE 4828 10685 3918 10356 11862 3857 7750 33990 11102 42178
p .904 .913 .055 .519 .035* .038* .080 .171 .598 .174
minF 0 (Consistency)
F <1 <1 2.688 <1 2.685 2.022 1.686 1.157 <1 1.236
df 1, 54 1, 42 1, 56 1, 55 1, 60 1, 53 1, 58 1, 60 1, 45 1, 59
p .913 .917 .107 .633 .107 .161 .199 .286 .618 .271
F1 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 5.933 <1 3.042 1.645 <1 <1 1.294 <1 6.781
df 1, 23 1, 23 1, 21 1, 20 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23 1, 23
MSE 3480 15134 4286 16788 8472 4156 8524 41890 14453 24463
p .635 .023* .540 .096 .212 .603 .663 .267 .867 .016*
F2 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 5.628 <1 <1 1.082 <1 <1 2.482 <1 2.479
df 1, 38 1, 38 1, 36 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 38 1, 37 1, 37 1, 36
MSE 4828 10685 3918 10356 11862 3857 7750 33990 11102 42178
p .497 .023* .838 .445 .305 .882 .939 .124 .682 .124
minF 0 (Consistency · Verb Bias)
F <1 2.888 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 1.815
df 1, 45 1, 58 1, 43 1, 51 1, 61 1, 44 1, 40 1, 46 1, 31 1, 56
p .695 .095 .845 .517 .422 .887 .940 .361 .876 .183
* p < .05.
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mation in the service of comprehension, rapidly enough
to impact on the interpretation of a pronoun early the
subordinate clause.
In the immediate focusing account (Greene &
Mc-Koon, 1995; Long & De Ley, 2000; McKoonet al., 1993), a sentence-initial fragment like ‘‘David
praised Linda because’’ is assumed to immediately bring
Linda into focus at the expense of David. Because
readers and listeners prefer to relate a personal pro-
noun to the most focused antecedent (see Arnold,
1998, for review), this account correctly predicted the
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reading at and immediately after the subsequent pro-
noun he. No such early effect, however, was predicted
by the clausal integration account (Garnham, 2001;
Garnham et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000), at least
not in its most common formulation, in which implicit
causality becomes relevant in sentence–final ‘retroac-
tive’ clausal integration only. We turn to a more detailed
discussion of the possible mechanisms behind our effects
shortly hereafter, and will then also examine the viability
of a more refined clausal integration account.
In our self-paced reading experiment, statistically
reliable effects of implicit causality first emerged on the
two words that followed the critical pronoun. As dis-
cussed before, this provides a straightforward explana-
tion for why Stewart et al. may have failed to detect
an early implicit causality effect in their two-fragment
self-paced reading study. As such, our findings also tes-
tify to the importance of tracking the use of a potentially
relevant cue to sentence comprehension with sufficient
temporal resolution, so that immediate small effects, as
well as their immediate spill-over, can be accurately
detected. Note that in our eye tracking experiment,
bias-inconsistent pronouns had most of their impact
on the reading times after the pronoun as well. This
spill-over phenomenon is entirely consistent with the
fact that, in an EEG experiment with (Dutch) spoken
sentences like ‘‘Anna shot at Linda as he jumped over
the fence’’, the processing consequences of the referen-
tially failing pronoun he can be seen to extend in the
EEG for at least a second after pronoun onset (Van Ber-
kum et al., 2004; see also Osterhout & Mobley, 1995).
Furthermore, because in the present study we had equat-
ed the pronoun as well as five words that followed the
pronoun across consistent and inconsistent versions of
each item, we can be confident that the spill-over delays
observed here were elicited by whether the pronoun con-
firmed or disconfirmed the implicit causality afforded by
the verb.
Although the interaction of Consistency and Verb
Bias should be interpreted with care, we note that
whether the verb was biased towards NP1 (e.g., disap-
point) or NP2 (e.g., praise) did not reliably modulate
the size of the inconsistency effect in our data. As such,
our results our different from those of Long and De Ley
(2000), who observed a significant inconsistency effect
for NP2-biased verbs only. In fact, if anything, our data
tend to go the opposite way, with numerically larger
delays after NP1-verbs than after NP2-verbs at all rele-
vant word positions in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
Again, we emphasize that the comparison of inconsis-
tency effects elicited by NP1 verbs and NP2 verbs is con-
founded with the effects of distance between anaphor
and antecedent, of first mention, and of the antecedent’s
structural position. Because of the specific purpose of
our study, we made no attempt to control for any ofthese potential confounds, and optimized the design on
other dimensions. Follow-up work will have to examine
why interactions with verb bias can come and go, and to
what extent the above-mentioned confounding factors
play a role.
Our findings allow us to reject the hypothesis that
verb-based implicit causality information is only used
during late, clause-final integration. However, they also
bear on two other suggested limitations on the use of
implicit causality in comprehension. One is that people
might only rapidly exploit this cue as part of some
unnatural processing strategy, elicited by experiments
in which implicit causality always provides reliable
information (Garnham, 2001). Because we obtained an
early effect of verb bias in experiments with as many
bias-consistent as bias-inconsistent continuations, our
results clearly do not support this suggestion. Our find-
ings also refute the hypothesis (Garnham et al., 1996)
that verb-based implicit causality might only be relevant
to comprehension when the referent of a pronoun can-
not be disambiguated by means of morphosyntactic
(e.g., gender) cues. In our materials, pronoun gender
unambiguously rules out one of the two candidate ante-
cedents. However, in spite of the reliable presence of a
strong gender cue, readers apparently cannot help but
use the probabilistic implicit causality cue as well.
How does implicit causality affect comprehension?
The latter observation raises an interesting question,
for why would people use a relatively weak probabilistic
cue if they have a much stronger and highly reliable cue
at their disposal? So far, we have discussed the results in
the context of two extant theoretical options: immediate
focusing and clausal integration. However, although our
findings disconfirm the clausal integration hypothesis,
this does not by itself compel us to adopt immediate focus-
ing as the correct account. In the remainder, wewill exam-
ine several possible underlying mechanisms, of which one
actually involves a refined version of clausal integration.
The integration account that our findings allow us to
dispense with is one in which implicit causality only
becomes relevant during late ‘retroactive’ clausal inte-
gration, at or close to the end of the because-clause. This
theoretical option is most clearly adopted by Stewart
et al. (2000), who were prepared to take implicit causal-
ity effects at the pronoun as evidence for immediate
focussing and against clausal integration. In his review,
Garnham (2001) appears to adopt a similar view. In
addition, Long and De Ley (2000) have noted that sen-
tence-final clausal integration of implicit causality infor-
mation is explicitly predicted by a more general model of
multi-clause sentence comprehension, the Connective
Integration Model (Millis & Just, 1994). According to
this model, when readers encounter a connective like
because, they set the representation of the first clause
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processed the complete second clause. Crucially, only
upon having completed the latter would the information
provided by the first clause be related to that provided
by the second. The clause-medial implicit causality
effects that we observed reveal that such relations are
computed much earlier, and thereby show that this spe-
cific claim of the Connective Integration Model cannot
be correct.
However, our findings are not necessarily inconsis-
tent with an incremental clausal integration account, in
which the information made available by the subordi-
nate clause is ‘retroactively’ related to the interpretation
of the main clause on a word-by-word basis. One such
account was proposed McDonald and MacWhinney
(1995), who in a probe verification task obtained very
early implicit causality effects in comprehension, right
after the pronoun. McDonald and MacWhinney took
their findings as evidence that the implicit causality
information provided by the main clause verb can be
used as soon as a referring pronoun in the subordinate
clause needs to be resolved. Along the same lines, Garn-
ham et al. (1996) also proposed a limited role for implicit
causality information during pronoun-induced anaphor-
ic processing. Note, however, that Garnham and col-
leagues assumed that implicit causality is only used to
resolve a morphosyntactically ambiguous pronoun, as
in ‘‘Betty punished Diane because she didn’t do the dish-
es.’’ In gender-disambiguated cases such as ‘‘Betty pun-
ished Roger because he didn’t do the dishes,’’ implicit
causality was deemed to be irrelevant, this because ‘‘a
coherent representation can be set up without consider-
ing which participant in an event of punishing is usually
the cause’’ (p. 538). To explain our results within an
incremental clausal integration framework, the latter
assumption would need to be abandoned.
As discussed before, our findings were predicted by
the immediate focusing account of how implicit causali-
ty affects sentence comprehension (Garnham et al., 1996;
Greene & McKoon, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993).
According to the immediate focusing model, the implicit
causality afforded by something like ‘‘David praised Lin-
da because. . .’’ changes the relative availability of the
two discourse entities involved, independent of any
potentially upcoming pronouns. In fact, in most charac-
terizations of immediate focusing (Garnham et al., 1996;
McKoon et al., 1993; but see Long & De Ley, 2000), the
consequences for later pronoun resolution are deeply
coincidental: implicit causality happens to highlight cer-
tain discourse entities at the expense of others as the sys-
tem incrementally updates its model of the discourse,
and later pronouns happen to be sensitive to the avail-
ability of candidate referents (see Gerrig & McKoon,
1998 for a similar view).
Immediate focusing has been characterized as ‘pro-
active’ (Garnham, 2001) because in this mechanism,and in contrast to late (as well as the incremental)
clausal integration, implicit causality has an effect on
the discourse model before the assumed moment of
‘retroactive’ integration. However, our early effects of
implicit causality are also compatible with a much
more ‘forward-looking’ mechanism. In ‘‘David praised
Linda because. . .,’’ the implicit causality associated with
praise supplies information about whose behavior or
state is the more likely immediate cause of the event
at hand. As such, and particularly when combined with
a connective such as because (Ehrlich, 1980; McKoon
et al., 1993), it can also support specific expectations
or predictions about how the unfolding utterance and
wider discourse might continue. In particular, com-
prehenders might anticipate that the because-clause is
going to provide information about Linda, perhaps
even actually refer to Linda. On the basis of research
with goal- and source-oriented verbs of transfer (to
receive, to send), Arnold (2001) has recently proposed
that readers and listeners continuously estimate the
likelihood that a referent will be continued in the
upcoming discourse. In addition, recent experiments
with head-mounted eye tracking and event-related
brain potentials suggest that people can use the seman-
tics afforded by verbs like ate or told to anticipate spe-
cific upcoming verb arguments, such as those that refer
to edible things (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Kamide
et al., 2003) or animate entities (Nieuwland & Van Ber-
kum, in press). We see no deep reason why the seman-
tics of receive, ate, and told would support such
anticipation whereas the equally constraining semantics
of a verb like praise would not. In our study, predic-
tions about who will soon be talked about and/or
referred to would be disconfirmed by the bias-inconsis-
tent pronoun, and might as such underlie the observed
reading time delays.
Exploring the potential of anticipatory mechanisms
somewhat further, we note that a fragment like ‘‘David
praised Linda because. . .’’ might in fact also lead people
to predict specific upcoming words. Research with gen-
der-inflected languages has recently shown that listeners
and readers can use sentential as well as discourse con-
text to rapidly make such lexical predictions, including,
for nouns, their lexically stored gender (Otten & Van
Berkum, 2004; Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Koo-
ijman, & Hagoort, 2005a; Wicha, Moreno, & Kutas,
2004). In view of these findings, it is not inconceivable
that a fragment like ‘‘David praised Linda because’’
allowed our readers to not only anticipate upcoming ref-
erence to Linda, but to actually also anticipate the spe-
cific pronoun she. To the extent that they do so, he
would disconfirm the lexical prediction and cause read-
ers to slow down.
We are currently conducting ERP research that may
help us decide whether early implicit causality effects
arise because of incremental clausal integration, immedi-
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relevant data, we reemphasize the puzzle posed by any
incremental clausal integration account (cf. Garnham
et al., 1996): why use a cue about who might be talked
about when a definitive cue about who is talked about
is available? Garnham and colleagues resolved the puzzle
by assuming that implicit causality would only impact on
the resolution of a morphosyntactically ambiguous pro-
noun, an assumption that our findings now allow us to
reject. If incremental clausal integration is modeled in
terms of simultaneous constraint satisfaction (e.g., Mac-
Donald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus &
Trueswell, 1995; Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994), one
might resolve the puzzle by assuming that the latter
cue, although formally overruled, is strong enough to
delay the system in converging onto a stable representa-
tion of the sentence up to that point. Another way out
might be to assume that when a pronoun is encountered,
implicit causality is actually used to fixate its referent
before the system considers the gender of the pronoun.6
Note, however, that whereas within an incremental
clausal integration account, some additional assump-
tions are needed to make sense of implicit causality
effects at gender-disambiguated pronouns, the puzzle is
solved for free if anticipatory or immediate focusing
mechanisms are at work. The reason is that in both
mechanisms, implicit causality information is used
before the pronoun comes along, i.e., before more defin-
itive evidence on causality has become available.5 The difference between implicit causality exerting its influ-
ence via immediate focusing or via the anticipation of what or
whom will be talked about next is a subtle one, because focus
and anticipation might be deeply related (see Long & De Ley,
2000, for exactly this position). However, whereas immediate
focusing can in principle be viewed as a ‘blind’ incremental
mechanism that simply modulates the availability of certain
discourse entities without looking beyond the linguistic input
processed so far, the anticipation of a specific upcoming topic
or referent is by definition a predictive, forward-looking
mechanism. It is for this reason that we distinguish these two
types of explanations for the impact of implicit causality on
language comprehension. At the same time, we sympathize with
an account in which the highlighting of particular discourse
entities is inextricably intertwined with—and perhaps in some
sense even equivalent to—expectations about what or whom
will be talked about next (e.g., Arnold, 2001). After all, what’s
the point of focusing on something that has just been
completely dealt with?
6 The idea that a ‘non-local’ probabilistic semantic constraint
can sometimes take precedence over a local and hard morpho-
syntactic constraint may strike one as odd. However, recent
evidence from ERPs suggests that when fixing the proper
reading of a Dutch relative pronoun, weak discourse-referential
factors can also momentarily prevail over a local syntactic
gender constraint (Van Berkum et al., 1999a, Van Berkum,
Brown, & Hagoort, 1999b; see also Van Gompel & Liversedge,
2003).How special is implicit causality?
Possibly inspired by the various principled classifica-
tion schemes that have been proposed for implicit cau-
sality verbs (see Rudolph & Fo¨rsterling, 1997, for
review), psycholinguists are sometimes inclined to grant
a special status to the causality related semantic features
of verbs like praise and disappoint. In terms of on-line
processing, however, we currently see no reason to
assume that the semantic constraints provided by implic-
it causality verbs are brought to bear on interpretation
in a ‘special way,’ different from how other (e.g., dis-
course-level) semantic constraints can impact on com-
prehension as it unfolds. Elsewhere (Van Berkum
et al., 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Van Berkum et al., 2005b;
Nieuwland & Van Berkum, in press), we have provided
ERP evidence that sentence-internal semantic factors
(e.g., local verb-argument animacy relations) and dis-
course-level ‘pragmatic’ factors (e.g., global theme, car-
toon-like genre, voice-inferred speaker characteristics)
can simultaneously constrain interpretation, and do so
in functionally equivalent ways. In view of the rapid
impact of implicit causality reported here, and in the
absence of compelling data to the contrary, we propose
that implicit causality is just another bit of meaning,
which, in interaction with other such bits jointly deter-
mines the interpretation of an unfolding utterance and
any predictions that can be made from there (see
Arnold, 2001, for a very similar proposal). The fact that
in this particular case the meaning unlocked by language
happens to be about interpersonal exchanges, although
critical if one studies social interaction, seems of little
relevance if one’s interest is in basic mechanisms of
incremental language interpretation.
If implicit causality is just another semantic cue in,
say, a graded, constraint-based processing architecture
(cf. MacDonald et al., 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell,
1995), this suggests a natural answer to several other
questions about implicit causality in language compre-
hension. One question that has received some attention
in the literature (e.g., Ehrlich, 1980; McKoon et al.,
1993; Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994) is whether
the impact of implicit causality verbs critically depends
on a subsequent causal connective, such as because.
Under the model that we are exploring, there would be
no principled ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to this question, because
interpretation is dynamically determined by a wide vari-
ety of semantic constraints, as well as by the sequencing
and relative timing with which these constraints become
available within the unfolding utterance. This means
that whereas a relatively weakly biased implicit causality
verb might need an additional because (or other causal
connective) to have a measurable impact, more strongly
biased verbs may well be able to single-handedly modu-
late the comprehender’s focus and/or expectations. A
graded constraint-based perspective on implicit causality
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of implicit causality varies across studies in terms of tim-
ing and effect size. Of course, whether these indeed are
the right answers remains to be established in detailed
experiments that parametrically vary the strength of a
verb-based implicit causality cue, orthogonal to various
other constraints. For example, to the extent that verb-
based implicit causality is ‘just another cue constraining
interpretation,’ suitable wider discourse context should
be able to neutralize, and perhaps even reverse the direc-
tion of the bias (cf. Arnold, 2001), as a function of
respective cue strengths.
In all, is there anything special about the semantic
characteristics of verbs like praise and apologize that
we denote as implicit causality? From a language pro-
cessing perspective, we do not believe there is. Our find-
ings show that people can exploit the semantic
information encoded in implicit causality verbs very rap-
idly, whenever this information is relevant to ongoing
comprehension. As such, implicit causality is on a par
with a wide range of other sources of information that
have been shown to affect the comprehension process
very rapidly. We know that the meaning of verbs like
ate and told allows listeners to anticipate specific upcom-
ing verb arguments (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999;
Nieuwland & Van Berkum, in press). We also know that
sentential as well as wider discourse context can support
the prediction of specific upcoming words (Otten & Van
Berkum, 2004; Van Berkum et al., 2005a; Wicha et al.,
2004). In view of these phenomena, what would be so
special about, say, anticipating a specific upcoming ref-
erent or pronoun after having read ‘‘David praised Linda
because. . .’’? After all, why would our expectations of
where the speaker or writer might go next be informed
by what can be buttered, eaten or talked to, but not
by why people do the things they do?
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A.1. NP1-biased verbs
Consistent. Dirk en Maartje waren afgelopen zaterdag
samen gaan winkelen, maar het werd niet echt een gezellige
dag. Dirk verveelde Maartje omdat hij al vanaf het begin van
de dag ontzettend liep te zeuren.
Inconsistent. Dirk en Maartje waren afgelopen zaterdag
samen gaan winkelen, maar het werd niet echt een gezellige
dag. Maartje verveelde Dirk omdat hij al vanaf het begin van
de dag eigenlijk geen zin had.Consistent. Thea en Paul reden allebei behoorlijk hard. Bij
een druk kruispunt botsten zij met hun auto’s stevig op elkaar.
Paul bood zijn excuses aan Thea aan omdat hij volgens de getu-
igen van het ongeluk alle schuld had.
Inconsistent. Thea en Paul reden allebei behoorlijk hard. Bij
een druk kruispunt botsten zij met hun auto’s stevig op elkaar.
Thea bood haar excuses aan Paul aan omdat hij volgens de
getuigen van het ongeluk geen schuld had.
Consistent. Niels en Chantal hadden een klassieke knipper-
lichtrelatie. Intussen was het zo vaak aan en uit geweest, dat
ze er allebei niets meer van snapten. Niels belde Chantal
omdat hij nu toch eindelijk wel eens duidelijkheid wilde
hebben.
Inconsistent. Niels en Chantal hadden een klassieke knipper-
lichtrelatie. Intussen was het zo vaak aan en uit geweest, dat ze
er allebei niets meer van snapten. Chantal belde Niels omdat hij
nu toch eindelijk wel eens duidelijkheid mocht geven.
Consistent. Meestal zijn de boswandelingen die Laura en
Hans maken erg leuk, maar nu konden zij elkaar wel schieten.
Hans ergerde Laura omdat hij bij elk plantje of beestje zo lang
bleef kijken.
Inconsistent. Meestal zijn de boswandelingen die Laura en
Hans maken erg leuk, maar nu konden zij elkaar wel schieten.
Laura ergerde Hans omdat hij bij elk plantje of beestje op haar
moest wachten.
Consistent. Eigenlijk was een scheiding de beste oplossing
voor Freek en Mieke. Hun huwelijk was door het vele vre-
emdgaan namelijk een hel geworden. Freek kwelde Mieke
omdat hij na de vele avontuurtjes nog steeds met andere vrou-
wen sliep.
Inconsistent. Eigenlijk was een scheiding de beste oplossing
voor Freek en Mieke. Hun huwelijk was door het vele vre-
emdgaan namelijk een hel geworden. Mieke kwelde Freek
omdat hij na de vele avontuurtjes nog steeds door haar bedro-
gen werd.
Consistent. Janine en Maarten waren toevallig allebei in de
bieb. Zij zaten naast elkaar aan een tafel te studeren. Maarten
stoorde Janine omdat hij tijdens het leren de hele tijd zeer irri-
tant kuchte.
Inconsistent. Janine en Maarten waren toevallig allebei in de
bieb. Zij zaten naast elkaar aan een tafel te studeren. Janine sto-
orde Maarten omdat hij tijdens het leren de hele tijd haar
gekuch hoorde.
Consistent. Max en Paula discussieerden vaak over de wer-
eldpolitiek. Bij de laatste discussie over de islam schrokken ze
een beetje van elkaar. Max verontrustte Paula omdat hij niet
eerder zulke discriminerende opmerkingen had gemaakt.
Inconsistent. Max en Paula discussieerden vaak over de wer-
eldpolitiek. Bij de laatste discussie over de islam schrokken ze
een beetje van elkaar. Paula verontrustte Max omdat hij niet
eerder zulke discriminerende opmerkingen had gehoord.
Consistent. Anouk en Johan hadden te vaak tegen elkaar
geschaakt op de schaakclub. Daarom was er tijdens het laatste
spelletje ook geen sprake van spanning. Johan won van Anouk
omdat hij na enkele tientallen potjes schaak haar spel goed
kende.
Inconsistent. Anouk en Johan hadden te vaak tegen elkaar
geschaakt op de schaakclub. Daarom was er tijdens het laatste
spelletje ook geen sprake van spanning. Anouk won van Johan
omdat hij na enkele tientallen potjes schaak haar niet kon
verassen.
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en gelijke wereld. Hun samenwerking bleek uitermate succesvol.
Nico inspireerde Lotte omdat hij bij het zien van onrecht altijd
direct actie wilde ondernemen.
Inconsistent. Nico en Lotte vochten samen voor een eerlijke
en gelijke wereld. Hun samenwerking bleek uitermate succesvol.
Lotte inspireerde Nico omdat hij bij het zien van onrecht altijd
op haar kon rekenen.
Consistent. De collega’s Maria en Karel hebben allebei zeer
graag de touwtjes in handen. Laatst escaleerde een situatie op
het werk tot een ware machtstrijd. Karel intimideerde Maria
omdat hij in de meeste gevallen dan zijn zin krijgt.
Inconsistent. De collega’s Maria en Karel hebben allebei zeer
graag de touwtjes in handen. Laatst escaleerde een situatie op
het werk tot een ware machtstrijd. Maria intimideerde Karel
omdat hij in de meeste gevallen dan toch snel toegeeft.
Consistent. Daniel en Irma moesten samen in de werkgroep
een referaat houden. Zij kregen helaas maar een week voor de
voorbereiding. Daniel irriteerde Irma omdat hij op elke bespre-
king weer andere ideee¨n opperde.
Inconsistent. Daniel en Irma moesten samen in de werkg-
roep een referaat houden. Zij kregen helaas maar een week voor
de voorbereiding. Irma irriteerde Daniel omdat hij op elke bes-
preking weer andere ideee¨n moest aanhoren.
Consistent. De relatie van Sabine en Boris had net een crisis
doorstaan. Zij waren allebei vanaf het begin niet zo trouw gewe-
est. Boris bekende alles aan Sabine omdat hij per se de waarheid
wilde vertellen.
Inconsistent. De relatie van Sabine en Boris had net een cri-
sis doorstaan. Zij waren allebei vanaf het begin niet zo trouw
geweest. Sabine bekende alles aan Boris omdat hij per se de
waarheid wilde horen.
Consistent. Marcel en Lisa hadden net weer een winkel
overvallen. Zij waren nu onder een viaduct de buit aan het ver-
delen. Marcel lichtte Lisa op omdat hij de vorige keer een flinke
som geld door haar was misgelopen.
Inconsistent. Marcel en Lisa hadden net weer een winkel
overvallen. Zij waren nu onder een viaduct de buit aan het ver-
delen. Lisa lichtte Marcel op omdat hij de vorige keer een flinke
som geld van haar had gestolen.
Consistent. De relatie tussen Hester en Gijs was na lang
geruzie dan toch stukgelopen. Ook in de laatste ruzie konden
zij niet eerlijk tegen elkaar zijn. Gijs loog tegen Hester omdat
hij de werkelijke reden achter hun problemen te pijnlijk voor
haar vond.
Inconsistent.De relatie tussenHester enGijswas na lang geru-
zie dan toch stukgelopen. Ook in de laatste ruzie konden zij niet
eerlijk tegen elkaar zijn. Hester loog tegen Gijs omdat hij de wer-
kelijke reden achter hun problemen te pijnlijk zou vinden.
Consistent. Bijna elk weekend gaan Willem en Merel wel
naar een expositie. Maar bij het zien van de Nachtwacht bleek
weer eens, dat zij sterk van mening verschilden. Willem verba-
asde Merel omdat hij zo een negatieve reactie had gegeven.
Inconsistent. Bijna elk weekend gaan Willem en Merel wel
naar een expositie. Maar bij het zien van de Nachtwacht bleek
weer eens, dat zij sterk van mening verschilden. Merel verba-
asde Willem omdat hij zo een negatieve reactie had gehoord.
Consistent. Tijdens een intense ruzie tussen Marcia en John
liepen de emoties hoog op. Hun relatie dreigde nu echt op de
klippen te lopen. John smeekte Marcia omdat hij ondanks de
vele problemen toch veel van haar hield.Inconsistent. Tijdens een intense ruzie tussen Marcia en John
liepen de emoties hoog op. Hun relatie dreigde nu echt op de
klippen te lopen. Marcia smeekte John omdat hij ondanks de
vele problemen toch haar grote liefde was.
Consistent. Enthousiast waren Simon en Carien samen aan
hun nieuwe opdracht begonnen. Inmiddels zijn zij een stuk
minder blij met elkaar. Simon stelde Carien teleur omdat hij
toch wel wat meer inzet had kunnen tonen.
Inconsistent. Enthousiast waren Simon en Carien samen aan
hun nieuwe opdracht begonnen. Inmiddels zijn zij een stuk
minder blij met elkaar. Carien stelde Simon teleur omdat hij
toch wel wat meer inzet had willen zien.
Consistent. Roos en Harm hadden elk een groot en bloei-
end bedrijf. Zij probeerden als elkaars grootste concurrenten
elkaar steeds de loef af te steken. Harm misleidde Roos
omdat hij anders de potentie¨le nieuwe opdrachtgever zou
kwijtraken.
Inconsistent. Roos en Harm hadden elk een groot en bloei-
end bedrijf. Zij probeerden als elkaars grootste concurrenten
elkaar steeds de loef af te steken. Roos misleidde Harm
omdat hij anders de potentie¨le nieuwe opdrachtgever zou
wegkapen.
Consistent. Vanochtend waren Jasper en Rianne allebei weer
te laat opgestaan voor het college. Zij stonden te dringen in de
badkamer. Jasper hinderde Rianne omdat hij voor zijn ochten-
dritueel alle ruimte gebruikte.
Inconsistent. Vanochtend waren Jasper en Rianne allebei
weer te laat opgestaan voor het college. Zij stonden te dringen
in de badkamer. Rianne hinderde Jasper omdat hij voor zijn
ochtendritueel alle ruimte nodig had.
Consistent. Op het feest werden Loes en Bart door wed-
erzijdse vrienden aan elkaar voorgesteld. Zij vonden elkaar
direct leuk en interessant. Bart fascineerde Loes omdat hij een
persoon met een sterk karakter bleek te zijn.
Inconsistent. Op het feest werden Loes en Bart door wed-
erzijdse vrienden aan elkaar voorgesteld. Zij vonden elkaar
direct leuk en interessant. Loes fascineerde Bart omdat hij een
persoon met een sterk karakter altijd interessant vond.
A.2. NP2-biased verbs
Consistent. Ruim vier jaar deden Joost en Karin onderzoek
naar het taalvermogen van dolfijnen. In die tijd kregen zij veel
waardering voor elkaar. Karin respecteerde Joost omdat hij
zowel theoretische als praktische vaardigheden in ruime mate
bezat.
Inconsistent. Ruim vier jaar deden Joost en Karin onderzoek
naar het taalvermogen van dolfijnen. In die tijd kregen zij veel
waardering voor elkaar. Joost respecteerde Karin omdat hij
zowel theoretische als praktische vaardigheden in een persoon
waardeerde.
Consistent. De boezemvrienden Anna en Lars zijn sinds kort
ook buren van elkaar. Na een drukke periode hadden ze ein-
delijk tijd gevonden voor een dineetje. Anna bedankte Lars
omdat hij de afgelopen weken bij de verhuizing zeer vaak
onmisbaar was gebleken.
Inconsistent. De boezemvrienden Anna en Lars zijn sinds
kort ook buren van elkaar. Na een drukke periode hadden ze
eindelijk tijd gevonden voor een dineetje. Lars bedankte Anna
omdat hij de afgelopen weken bij de verhuizing haar hulp zeer
gewaardeerd had.
A.W. Koornneef, J.J.A. Van Berkum / Journal of Memory and Language 54 (2006) 445–465 463Consistent. Lex en Suzan waren van die personen die elkaar
absoluut niet kunnen uitstaan. Elke keer dat zij elkaar tegenkw-
amen, liep het op ruzie uit. Suzan verafschuwde Lex omdat hij
werkelijk altijd domme en botte opmerkingen tegen haar
maakte.
Inconsistent. Lex en Suzan waren van die personen die elk-
aar absoluut niet kunnen uitstaan. Elke keer dat zij elkaar tege-
nkwamen, liep het op uit. Lex verafschuwde Suzan omdat hij
werkelijk altijd domme en botte opmerkingen ruzie van haar
hoorde.
Consistent. Els en Bas deden samen mee aan een vraagges-
prek over de liefde. Toen hen gevraagd werd waarom ze van
elkaar hielden, was het antwoord duidelijk. Els hield van Bas
omdat hij altijd zichzelf en ontzettend vrolijk was in haar
aanwezigheid.
Inconsistent. Els en Bas deden samen mee aan een vraag-
gesprek over de liefde. Toen hen gevraagd werd waarom ze
van elkaar hielden, was het antwoord duidelijk. Bas hield
van Els omdat hij altijd zichzelf en ontzettend vrolijk bij haar
kon zijn.
Consistent. Guido en Heleen hadden hard gestudeerd voor
een tentamen. Jammer genoeg haalden ze het allebei niet.
Heleen troostte Guido omdat hij na het horen van de uitslag
toch wel erg teleurgesteld had gereageerd.
Inconsistent. Guido en Heleen hadden hard gestudeerd voor
een tentamen. Jammer genoeg haalden ze het allebei niet. Guido
troostte Heleen omdat hij na het horen van de uitslag zag hoe
moeilijk ze het had.
Consistent. Sofie en Martijn hielden van jongs af aan al van
rollenspelletjes. Zij speelden elke week weer een andere situatie
na. Sofie strafte Martijn omdat hij deze week een zeer verve-
lende schooljongen was.
Inconsistent. Sofie en Martijn hielden van jongs af aan al van
rollenspelletjes. Zij speelden elke week weer een andere situatie
na. Martijn strafte Sofie omdat hij deze week een zeer verve-
lende schoolmeester was.
Consistent. Sinds lange tijd waren Bob en Wendy werkzaam
bij een advocatenbureau. Als zij samenwerkten vlogen de ver-
wijten over en weer. Wendy bekritiseerde Bob omdat hij de hele
tijd alle moeilijke beslissingen aan haar over liet.
Inconsistent. Sinds lange tijd waren Bob en Wendy wer-
kzaam bij een advocatenbureau. Als zij samenwerkten vlogen
de verwijten over en weer. Bob bekritiseerde Wendy omdat
hij de hele tijd alle moeilijke beslissingen helemaal alleen moest
nemen.
Consistent. Olga en Sander zaten in hetzelfde korfbalteam.
Ze hadden zojuist met dit team een belangrijk toernooi gewon-
nen. Olga feliciteerde Sander omdat hij na zo’n goed gespeelde
finale een schouderklopje zeker wel verdiende.
Inconsistent. Olga en Sander zaten in hetzelfde korfbalteam.
Ze hadden zojuist met dit team een belangrijk toernooi gewon-
nen. Sander feliciteerde Olga omdat hij na zo’n goed gespeelde
finale een schouderklopje wel terecht vond.
Consistent. Hoewel David en Mirjam al sinds lange tijd
samen op pianoles zaten, hadden ze totaal geen waardering
voor elkaar. Mirjam minachtte David omdat hij na al die jaren
les nog steeds geen vooruitgang boekte.
Inconsistent. Hoewel David en Mirjam al sinds lange tijd
samen op pianoles zaten, hadden ze totaal geen waardering
voor elkaar. David minachtte Mirjam omdat hij na al die jaren
les nog steeds geen vooruitgang zag.Consistent. Afgelopen dinsdag vierden Nina en Vincent
ieder hun elfde verjaardag. Ze hadden allebei om een nieuwe
mountainbike gevraagd. Nina benijdde Vincent omdat hij de
zo fel begeerde mountainbike wel had gekregen.
Inconsistent. Afgelopen dinsdag vierden Nina en Vincent
ieder hun elfde verjaardag. Ze hadden allebei om een nieuwe
mountainbike gevraagd. Vincent benijdde Nina omdat hij de
zo fel begeerde mountainbike niet had gekregen.
Consistent. Luuk en Marije kwamen elkaar tegen in de stu-
dio’s van Hilversum. Zij hadden beide auditie gedaan voor een
soapserie. Marije prees Luuk omdat hij weer een zeer goede
prestatie voor de camera had neergezet.
Inconsistent. Luuk en Marije kwamen elkaar tegen in de stu-
dio’s van Hilversum. Zij hadden beide auditie gedaan voor een
soapserie. Luuk prees Marije omdat hij weer een zeer goede
prestatie van haar had gezien.
Consistent. Carlijn en Steven hadden vanuit hun studieve-
reniging voor het eerst samen een congres georganiseerd. Na
afloop moesten zij alleen nog de laatste rommel opruimen. Car-
lijn complimenteerde Steven omdat hij alles zo efficient en snel
geregeld had.
Inconsistent. Carlijn en Steven hadden vanuit hun studieve-
reniging voor het eerst samen een congres georganiseerd. Na
afloop moesten zij alleen nog de laatste rommel opruimen. Ste-
ven complimenteerde Carlijn omdat hij alles zo efficie¨nt en snel
geregeld vond.
Consistent. De rechtbank had het bedrijf van Michiel en
Cindy failliet verklaard. Zij moesten nu hun schulden aflossen.
Cindy stelde Michiel verantwoordelijk omdat hij het financieel
beleid van begin af aan had tegengewerkt.
Inconsistent. De rechtbank had het bedrijf van Mich-
iel en Cindy failliet verklaard. Zij moesten nu hun
schulden aflossen. Michiel stelde Cindy verantwoordelijk
omdat hij het financieel beleid van begin af aan had
afgekeurd.
Consistent. Sandra en Hugo hadden een nogal verhitte
geschiedenis vol ruzies en nijd. Zij konden elkaar inmiddels
wel schieten. Sandra haatte Hugo omdat hij zo veel achterbakse
en vuile streken had uitgehaald.
Inconsistent. Sandra en Hugo hadden een nogal verhitte
geschiedenis vol ruzies en nijd. Zij konden elkaar inmiddels
wel schieten. Hugo haatte Sandra omdat hij zo veel achterbakse
en vuile streken had moeten incasseren.
Consistent. Guus en Zita werkten beiden op dezelfde afdel-
ing van een bedrijf voor mobiele telefonie. Helaas, door slechte
winstresultaten moest het bedrijf snijden in het personeel. Zita
ontsloeg Guus omdat hij nu eenmaal niet genoeg vertrouwen
van de leiding had.
Inconsistent. Guus en Zita werkten beiden op dezelfde afdel-
ing van een bedrijf voor mobiele telefonie. Helaas, door slechte
winstresultaten moest het bedrijf snijden in het personeel. Guus
ontsloeg Zita omdat hij nu eenmaal niet genoeg vertrouwen in
haar capaciteiten had.
Consistent. Op de Rietveld-academie waren Ellen en Frits
elkaar voor het eerst tegen gekomen. Sindsdien deelden zij
samen een atelier. Ellen bewonderde Frits omdat hij een groot
talent voor beeldhouwen had laten zien.
Inconsistent. Op de Rietveld-academie waren Ellen en Frits
elkaar voor het eerst tegen gekomen. Sindsdien deelden zij
samen een atelier. Frits bewonderde Ellen omdat hij een groot
talent voor beeldhouwen in haar had herkend.
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samen voor een internetbedrijf gewerkt. Zij waren helaas op sle-
chte voet uit elkaar gegaan. Rachel klaagde Mark aan omdat
hij een grote som geld van het bedrijf verduisterd bleek te
hebben.
Inconsistent. Tot een jaar geleden hadden Mark en Rachel
samen voor een internetbedrijf gewerkt. Zij waren helaas op sle-
chte voet uit elkaar gegaan. Mark klaagde Rachel aan omdat
hij een grote som geld van het bedrijf tegoed bleek te hebben.
Consistent. Op de schermschool hadden Tanja en Karl zich
ingeschreven voor een wedstrijd. Omdat zij voor het eerst elka-
ars tegenstander waren, overwogen zij elkaars kansen. Tanja
vreesde Karl omdat hij door vele jaren van ervaring meer kans
had.
Inconsistent. Op de schermschool hadden Tanja en Karl zich
ingeschreven voor een wedstrijd. Omdat zij voor het eerst elka-
ars tegenstander waren, overwogen zij elkaars kansen. Karl vre-
esde Tanja omdat hij door vele jaren van ervaring haar klasse
zag.
Consistent. Hercules en Athena woonden temidden van
andere goden beiden op de Olympus. Zij kenden elkaar letter-
lijk al eeuwen. Athena aanbad Hercules omdat hij als een echte
Griekse god zo vaak al haar wensen had vervuld.
Inconsistent. Hercules en Athena woonden temidden van
andere goden beiden op de Olympus. Zij kenden elkaar letter-
lijk al eeuwen. Hercules aanbad Athena omdat hij als een echte
Griekse god zo vaak viel voor de dochters van Zeus.
Consistent. Babet en Thijs waren al jaren verbonden aan
hetzelfde natuurkundig instituut. Als team hadden zij al voor
meerdere theoretische doorbraken gezorgd. Babet waardeerde
Thijs omdat hij als wetenschapper altijd goede feedback aan
haar gaf.
Inconsistent. Babet en Thijs waren al jaren verbonden aan
hetzelfde natuurkundig instituut. Als team hadden zij al voor
meerdere theoretische doorbraken gezorgd. Thijs waardeerde
Babet omdat hij als wetenschapper altijd goede feedback van
haar kreeg.References
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